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Abstract
This article focuses on the European Union’s approach to border management. The concept 
of border management includes not only: 1) the physical control over borders and the flow of 
goods and persons through ports of entry; but also 2) the management of immigration, migrant 
flows, and asylum request;, as well as 3) the combatting of cross-border threats. This article will 
explore existing European policies and structures as well as recent policy changes in select areas 
of border management in order to understand some of the fundamental aspects of Europe’s 
evolving approach to managing and safeguarding its internal and external borders.  It argues 
that fears of migration and cross-border security threats have led to a shift in the EU paradigm 
for managing its internal and external borders, particularly with respect to border controls and 
managing the asylum process.
Introduction
The European Union (EU) member states and a handful of affiliated countries share the 
world’s most extensive border management regime. The  concept of border management, 
usually exclusively associated with the physical control over borders and the flow of goods 
and persons through ports of entry, also deals with the management of immigration and of 
the mitigation of cross-border threats including criminal activity and terrorism. Since the 
onset of the European migrant crisis from the Middle East and North Africa in the wake of 
the outbreak of the Syrian civil war and the collapse of Libya (both in 2011), there have been 
some dramatic shifts in the border management policies of some EU member states. This has 
brought into question whether it is possible to turn back the clock, given the comparative 
drop in migration rates since the height of the crisis in 2015, or whether the changes 
instituted by a range of member states, and being considered by others, will fundamentally 
change the manner in which borders are managed in Europe. 
We will  explore existing European policies and structures as well as recent policy changes in 
select areas within each of the three aforementioned aspects of border management in order 
to understand some of the fundamental aspects of Europe’s evolving approach to managing 
and safeguarding its internal and external borders.  More specifically, we will look at issues 
pertaining to the status of the Schengen area and control of external borders with non-EU/
Schengen countries, the management of immigration within the European Union and its 
member states, and the EU role in combatting cross-border threats.
From the perspective of American policymakers, one reason to analyze  homeland security-
related issues (such as border security) overseas is the opportunity to explore alternative policy 
approaches to solving roughly comparable types of problems. This may help U.S. policymakers 
avoid replicating mistakes made overseas and avoid having to “reinvent the wheel” when policy 
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ideas implemented overseas prove fruitful.  Ideally, this research  will also stimulate thought 
about potential policy directions and/or areas of exploration in the ongoing quest to improve 
American border security and immigration policies.
Literature on Border Management in Europe 
The topics related to border management and immigration in the European context have 
been addressed widely in the scholarly literature on border and migration studies, though 
much of the more recent literature focuses less on policy, strictly speaking, and more on 
geospatial, political, or cultural aspects of European borders and border regimes.  For example, 
from a geospatial perspective, Bellanova and Duez look at the European Border Surveillance 
(EUROSUR) project in the context of the Mediterranean and look at how the concept of a border 
has changed and what constitutes an “area of control.”1  Other scholars, such as Longo, argue 
that borders should not be viewed just as specific locations but rather as “…thick, multifaceted, 
and binational institutions…”2 
 
From a political perspective, Jeandesboz focuses on the political messaging of EU border 
control activities and, in particular, the manner in which EU actions are justified to the public.3  
Vaughan-Williams, on the other hand, looks at the competing discourses of ‘humanitarization’ 
and ‘securitization’ in influencing political activity.4  Beznec argues that the EU has created 
a ‘crisis of territoriality’ in member states that has necessitated creating a new political and 
conceptual framework of the border.5
Among the studies of border culture in the European context, Zaittoi suggests that there is a 
culture of border control in Europe which shapes how problems are viewed, the choice of actors 
involved, and the determination of which practices should be adopted.6  Kramsch, Aparna, and 
Degu take a linguistic approach to the geographic bounding of national cultures arguing that the 
insertion of migrant languages in Europe is weakening the link between language and territory 
as well as what they view as the inward looking and securitized concept of European territories.7
As the above brief discussion of some of the more recent literature suggests, scholars have 
taken wide-ranging approaches to look at European border management issues, but, as noted, 
the focus of scholarship tends to be more heavily weighted to the conceptual and theoretical 
aspects of the issue.
Background  
Border management in Europe is a curious amalgamation of international agreements, 
supra-state controls, and individual national policies. This reflects the tension in Europe 
between centripetal and centrifugal impulses that, on the one hand, pull EU member states 
closer together towards a common federative state and, on the other, assert the individual 
identity, sovereignty, and political autonomy of each of the nation-states that comprise the 
EU.8 The European Union, which has its origins in the creation of the European Coal and Steel 
Community in 1950 and the European Economic Community in 1957, is based on efforts not 
only to pool Europe’s economic resources and encourage intra-European trade, but also to work 
Homeland Security Affairs | Volume 16 – Article 1  (April 2020) | WWW.HSAJ.ORG
4 Border Management in Europe: Is the Paradigm Evolving?   |   By Nadav Morag
towards a federation of European states under a supra-national authority (a kind of ‘United 
States of Europe’) as a way of preventing the type of destructive European infighting that 
spawned two world wars.9 
While the EU is still far from, and probably unlikely to ever become, a true federation, there 
are entire areas of public policy which  have traditionally been under the purview of national 
governments and are now under the control of EU institutions. For example, since the EU 
member states form a single economy, the EU has the authority to regulate economic matters 
ranging from agricultural policy, banking, product standards, environmental protection, food 
and water safety, energy policy, trade agreements with non-EU countries, antitrust efforts, and 
a broad range of other matters.10 In addition, for those nineteen countries that are members 
of the Eurozone, the EU has control over monetary policy, as these EU member states share a 
common currency overseen by the European Central Bank (ECB).11  
The European Union operates via seven institutions: the European Commission, the European 
Parliament, the European Council, the Council of the European Union, the Court of Justice 
of the European Union, the European Court of Auditors, and the aforementioned European 
Central Bank. The Brussels-based European Commission is the executive/bureaucratic arm of 
the EU and is responsible for overseeing and managing the various EU areas of responsibility 
and on proposing legislation to the European Parliament (EP) and ensuring that EP laws are 
executed.12 The Strasbourg-based European Parliament oversees budgets and passes legislation 
(based exclusively on recommendations from the European Commission) and members of 
the EP (MEPs) are elected by popular voting in districts of roughly equal size in proportion to 
their respective populations throughout the EU. This means that larger countries have a larger 
share of the seats – Germany with nearly 83 million people, has 96 MEPs (out of a total of 751), 
whereas Malta, with less than 500,000 citizens, has six MEPs.13 
The Brussels-based European Council is a kind of coordinating policy shop consisting of European 
heads of government which usually meets four times a year to discuss and coordinate strategic 
policy.  The Brussels-based Council of the European Union serves as the mechanism for the 
governments of EU member states to influence EU laws and policies.14 The membership of 
the Council will vary depending on the policy issues being discussed (EU energy policy will be 
discussed and formulated by member states’ energy ministers, agricultural policy will be discussed 
and formulated by agriculture ministers, etc.). The Council of the EU will vote on issues based 
on either a simple majority (15 member states voting in favor), a qualified majority (55 percent 
of the member states representing at least 65 percent of the total population of the EU), or 
unanimously.15 The nature of the type of vote depends on the issue at hand.  The voting system in 
the Council is supposed to strike a balance between the will of the majority populations in the EU 
(i.e., the large member states) and the interests of minorities (i.e., the small member states). Many 
crucial issues require a unanimous vote, including admitting new countries to the EU, and this 
accordingly gives even the smallest member states a veto over this process. 
The European Parliament thus acts as the voice of the citizens of the member states (because 
it is directly elected by them) and the Council of the European Union acts as the voice of their 
respective governments – rather like the lower house of the German parliament, which represents 
the popular vote and the upper house, which represents Germany’s state governments. 
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The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union together act as the main 
decision-making bodies of the EU.16 The judicial branch of the EU is the Luxembourg-based Court 
of Justice of the European Union, which interprets EU law and settles legal disputes between 
member states.  Finally, the European Court of Auditors ensures that EU funds are managed 
properly and the European Central Bank, as noted earlier, oversees monetary policy.
As far as border management issues are concerned, during the first decades of the existence 
of these European supra-national structures, borders between member states were policed 
and ports of entry controlled (though many goods could transit the borders free of customs 
duties) and thus border management issues were firmly within the purview of the respective 
member states, similar to the manner in which border management was handled within the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and is now handled by its successor, the United 
States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) . Border management in Europe began to change 
in 1986 with the adoption of the Single European Act by the parliament of what was then the 
European Community (EC), another precursor to the European Union.  Article 13 of the Single 
European Act called for the “…free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital…” across 
the borders dividing member states.17 This was a landmark provision because it set the stage for 
the removal of border controls between at least some of the EU members, though at the time it 
was more of a statement of intent than a concrete policy change.
Alongside the strategic vision of a borderless Europe, a range of international agreements 
(bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral) were signed between various European countries 
within what was then the EC for the exchange of information between their respective police 
and intelligence agencies on trans-border threats, thus acting to tighten cooperation and 
coordination across national borders.18 In addition, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, 
who had earlier created the Benelux Economic Union, had led the way in abolishing border 
controls between them in 1970 as part of this trilateral customs union. The success of the 
Benelux arrangement helped spur a broader multilateral agreement to abolish border controls 
between the Benelux countries and France and Germany. This multilateral agreement was 
signed in 1985 in the town of Schengen in Luxembourg and, upon implementation in its 
present form in 1995, brought about what is commonly referred to as the Schengen System, a 
framework that includes open internal borders between member states of the system (most of 
whom are members of the EU, though not all members of the EU are members of the Schengen 
system). By the mid-1990s, since the Single European Act called for open borders and since, in 
practice, open borders were being implemented via the multilateral (that is, between respective 
national governments) Schengen framework, it became necessary to create an affiliation 
between Schengen and the European Union’s legal and institutional framework, something that 
was accomplished via the Treaty of Amsterdam of May 1999. This, however, still left out a few 
loose ends given that some Schengen countries were not part of the EU (Norway, Switzerland, 
Iceland, and Lichtenstein) and some EU countries were not part of most  or all aspects of 
Schengen (the United Kingdom, soon to be out of the EU, the Republic of Ireland, Romania and 
Bulgaria – the latter two due to persistent concerns about the rule of law in these countries).  
In a nutshell, the various agreements that have been signed over time and that collectively 
make up the current Schengen system not only removed border controls between Schengen 
Area countries, but also created common border controls, procedures, and information-sharing 
at ‘external borders’, that is, non-Schengen land borders, maritime borders, and all ports of 
entry from non-Schengen Area countries (air, sea, and land). The Schengen system does not, 
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however,  eliminate border controls completely between its members as the agreements 
include provisions for temporarily reinstating national border controls in the event of crises or 
during major national events (sporting events, commemorations, etc.).
Within the sphere of immigration issues, the Schengen Area countries also agreed to create a 
common short-term visa for visitors coming from outside of the Area.  Aside from these short-
term visitors, immigration law and policy regarding non-EU and Schengen country citizens 
has remained firmly within the purview of the individual member states, though they have 
agreed to common standards regarding the reception and processing of asylum-seekers. As 
far as the combatting of smuggling, human trafficking, and cross border-related terrorism, 
the EU and Schengen frameworks provide for common databases (the Schengen Information 
System, version II, and the Visa Information System) to track all people entering and leaving 
the Schengen Area and to deny entry to individuals at one country’s external border who have 
previously been denied entry at another country’s external border (or to apprehend those for 
whom a European Arrest Warrant has been issued).19  
Finally, in terms of coordination and cooperation, EU countries with external land and/or 
maritime borders can call on border security aid from other EU countries within the framework 
of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, previously the European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of 
the European Union (known as Frontex and established in 2004). The new European Border 
and Coast Guard Agency (still known as Frontex) helps design common training standards and 
carries out assessments and risk analyses. The agency also has the capacity to provide member 
governments with Raid Border Intervention Teams (RABITs) - teams of border guards from other 
EU countries to deploy at an external Schengen border in order to assist a member state facing 
challenges to securing its border.  Moreover, the EU’s 1990 Dublin Convention and 2003 Dublin II 
Regulation, allow for cross-border surveillance, cross border hot pursuit, and faster extradition 
between member states.20
The discussion above provides a snapshot of Schengen and EU rules and policies that 
evolved over decades.  In the wake of 2015, which constituted the start of Europe’s worst 
migration crisis since World War II, a number of Schengen/EU countries began to question the 
desirability of free movement of persons within the Schengen Area and, at least at the present, 
political trends suggest that we are likely to see a return to more restrictive European border 
management policies and a weakening of the Schengen system.
Control of Borders and Ports of Entry: 
Migration Pressures on Schengen
Some of the first storm clouds that suggested that all might not be well within the Schengen 
Area appeared on 15 April 2011 when a Franco-Italian row broke out over migrants. At that 
time, a large group of approximately 25,000 Tunisians arrived by sea to the Italian island of 
Lampedusa (situated near the Tunisian coast) requesting asylum. Under EU rules (the Dublin 
Regulation), asylum-seekers are required to stay in the first EU country they set foot in and 
apply for asylum there. The host country is expected to feed, clothe, and house the migrants 
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and process their asylum applications, thereby determining which individuals are eligible for 
asylum and thus to be accorded refugee status and which individuals are economic migrants 
who are eligible to be deported.21 
From an EU-wide perspective, the problem with these rules is that most EU countries do not 
border on areas that are crossing points for large numbers of asylum-seekers, and this means 
that countries such as Spain, Italy, and Greece have to deal with an inordinate amount of 
migrants and thus are required to shoulder much of the cost of providing for these migrants 
and processing their applications. In April 2011, the Italian government balked at having to 
shelter and feed some 25,000 individuals and decided instead to facilitate their movement to 
other parts of the EU where they could presumably apply for asylum. The Italian government 
consequently issued the migrants with a temporary ‘humanitarian passport’ and released 
them to move further into the Schengen Area. Not surprisingly, France, Belgium, and Germany 
protested the Italian measure and argued that Italy was violating common EU rules with respect 
to dealing with asylum-seekers.22 Two months later, France temporarily re-established border 
controls at its border with Italy and stopped Italian train traffic into France for six hours. While 
the crisis was ultimately resolved fairly quickly, it portended future problems because, in part, 
EU countries without external Schengen borders did not have to deal with masses of migrants, 
at least at the time. The French were technically within their rights in deciding to temporarily 
close the border since the Schengen Borders Code, as constituted at the time, allowed for any 
country to impose temporary border controls for up to six months in the event of a threat to 
“public policy or internal security.”23 
France’s decision to temporarily close its border in 2011 may have been the impetus for the 
promulgation of Chapter II, Article 26 of the 2016 version of the Schengen Borders Code, which 
stipulates that “migration and the crossing of a country’s borders by large numbers of third-
country nationals should not, per se, be considered to be a threat to public policy or internal 
security.”24 However, since the new version of the Schengen Borders Code still allows countries 
to close borders temporarily for security reasons, in some cases migrant traffic has simply 
been reclassified as a security threat. Eventually, the EU member states recognized that the 
Dublin Regulation was inherently unfair and placed a disproportionate burden on a handful of 
southern European countries that received the overwhelming majority of migrants. In 2016, the 
EU’s executive arm, the European Commission, proposed a mechanism to allow a percentage of 
asylum-seekers to move to a less-burdened EU country and apply for asylum there in the event 
that a given country was overburdened with a large flow of migrants. This measure was not 
without controversy and opponents of this scheme felt that requiring them to accept migrants 
was a gross infringement of national sovereignty and it was up to the individual member states 
to decide whether or not they wanted to open their borders to migrants.25 Ultimately, this issue 
remains to be decided but it has contributed to disillusionment with the EU in several eastern 
European countries including Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary.26
The Schengen system was further tested with the massive surge in migration and asylum 
applications from the Middle East and North Africa in 2015. That year there were over 1.2 
million new asylum claims (by contrast, in 2018, there were just over 635,000 new asylum 
claims across the EU) with just over one million of these migrants accessing the EU by sea via 
Greece, Italy, or Spain.27 In response to the surge of migrants entering central Europe via Greece 
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and the Balkans, the majority of EU/Schengen countries elected to reestablish border controls 
on their internal Schengen borders. Germany re-imposed border controls on its border with 
Austria in September 2015, followed quickly by Austria reestablishing border controls on its 
borders with Italy, Hungary, Slovenia, and Slovakia. In response Slovenia and Hungary imposed 
border controls on their respective southern borders. By mid-2016, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, 
Belgium, and France had all joined the list of countries re-imposing temporary border controls 
on their internal Schengen borders. Since then, these countries have all alternately imposed and 
then removed ‘temporary’ border controls, presumably  to slow the flow of migrants.  Given 
that Article 26 of the Code no longer allows the prevention of cross-border migrant flows to be 
cited as justification for re-imposing border controls, these moves are characterized, as noted 
earlier, to be designed to thwart security threats from “significant secondary movements,” 
which refers to the movement of migrants from the country in which they are seeking asylum to 
another country.28  
At present, the future of a Europe without more or less permanent internal border controls 
is open to serious question. An analysis by Tobia Etzold and Raphael Bossong of the German 
Institute for International and Security Affairs, suggests that border controls within Europe 
are likely to become permanent, though the nature of these controls and the degree to which 
they are felt varies as some countries engage in random checks, others operate border checks 
at a limited number of crossing points, and others employ license plate readers and other 
technology that creates lower profile border control checks.29 While some efforts are afoot to 
prohibit Schengen countries from repeatedly extending six month ‘temporary’ border controls 
and to limit such measures to one year, this is unlikely to be acceptable to some of the major 
Schengen signatories and they could take back border security functions on the grounds that 
national security issues are ultimately under the purview of EU/Schengen member states and 
not the EU as a whole.30  
Germany, arguably the most critical member state of the EU, has provided a potential indication 
as to the direction the political winds are blowing regarding maintaining border controls 
as the coalition agreement that was signed in early 2018 reaffirms the country’s ‘right’ to 
establish border controls until the EU comes up with a more stringent policy with respect to the 
Schengen external borders and the distribution of asylum-seekers across the EU.31  As noted 
earlier, Germany is not alone as a number of other EU countries have re-established border 
controls of various kinds, in order to combat illegal migration and terrorism threats, and these 
measures appear to be politically popular among at least a significant minority.  
According to a December 2018 study published by the European Commission, only 55 percent 
of respondents viewed the Schengen Area as a contributor to security, with 30 percent of 
respondents believing it harmed security and 15 percent unsure of whether or not it was 
beneficial for security.32  European politicians will likely need to take into account this rather 
large minority of European citizens who believe Schengen arrangements harm security or may 
harm security and this is likely to mean that they will want to curb the traditional freedom of 
movement across internal Schengen borders on a more permanent basis.  At the same time, 
three-quarters of respondents in the aforementioned European Commission poll recognize that 
the Schengen Area has brought significant economic benefits to Europe.33  European politicians 
will have to navigate the desire for greater security and the curbing of migration among sizeable 
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chunks of their respective populations with the clear desire of the majority for maintaining 
the economic benefits of Schengen.  This is likely to necessitate some sort of compromise that 
will avoid the permanent re-establishment of border controls on internal Schengen borders 
with cameras with license plate readers at border crossings, police checkpoints inside the 
member states, and the random re-establishment of full border controls for different border 
crossings and at different times.  European officials will doubtless be interested in looking at the 
operation of the border crossings to be established between Northern Ireland and the Republic 
of Ireland in order to determine if this can be a test case for the use of technology and other 
measures to facilitate smooth border crossing (or not, as the case may be).  
There is no indication that the two issues largely driving the desire to re-establish border controls 
within Schengen, namely terrorism and migration, are likely to go away.  Terrorism typically ebbs 
and flows, but there is no evidence that Europe has ceased to be a target of Jihadist and other 
groups from outside the EU.  As far as migration pressures are concerned, while migrant numbers 
coming from the Middle East do not currently reach the levels of the 2015 crisis, the continued 
economic and social problems in Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq, are likely to ensure migratory 
pressures from those countries.  In addition, millions of Syrian refugees in Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, 
and internal refugees in Syria itself, are unlikely to be repatriated in the near term and thus are 
likely to ensure continued pressure for migration to Europe.  As Turkey is generally the gateway 
for such migrants into the Schengen Area, much of the post 2016 reduction in refugee flows from 
the Middle East could be attributed to the March 2016 agreement between Turkey and the EU on 
readmitting migrants arriving on Greek islands in the Aegean.  In July 2019, Turkey announced that 
it would no longer abide by the terms of the agreement and while it has been coaxed back to the 
agreement, there can be little doubt that EU member states cannot rely on this agreement staying 
in place forever.  
Moreover, at least to some degree, the closing of the Aegean route has led migrants from 
the Middle East to try and access the Schengen Area via highly risky Mediterranean crossings 
from North Africa to Spain and Italy.34  In addition, population growth and youth bulges in 
sub-Saharan Africa, as well as the chaos in Libya, have resulted in increasing waves of African 
migrants – with the number of migrants trying to travel to Europe more than doubling between 
2010 and 2017.35  In short, the main drivers for the re-establishment of permanent internal 
border controls in some form are not likely to go away.
Management of Migration
Unlike many areas of economic activity and regulation, immigration matters are largely, though 
not exclusively, under the purview of the member states of the European Union. This should not 
come as a surprise as the power to determine citizenship status is one that lies at the root of 
the concept of national sovereignty and member states are understandably loathe to concede 
this authority. Nevertheless, over the years EU member states have conceded some aspects of 
immigration law and policy to EU institutions. For example, as noted earlier, temporary access 
(for tourists and other short-term visitors) is granted across the Schengen Area via the issuing 
of a common visa (commonly referred to as the ‘Schengen Visa’) provided by the country that 
serves as the first port of entry for non-Schengen Area citizens. In addition, under Title III of the 
1957 Treaty of Rome, every member state of the EU must allow citizens of every other member 
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state to live and work in the country.36 Indeed, the United Kingdom, which is not a member of 
the Schengen area and thus does not accept Schengen Visas, has long been unhappy with the 
aforementioned free movement of workers provisions of the European Union and the fact that 
citizens from other EU states have been able to work and reside freely in the UK has been one 
of the bones of contention motivating the British decision to leave the European Union.37  
In addition to visas and residence by citizens of other EU states, members of the EU are 
bound by the 1951 United Nations Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 
(Refugee Convention), which, under the principle of ‘non-refoulement’, prohibits countries from 
repatriating persons granted refugee status (i.e., those who have a “well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, 
or political opinion…”38), as well as the Treaty of Rome, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(EU Charter) and the Maastricht Treaty. Since 2013, EU member states have been bound by the 
current version of the Asylum Procedures Directive (APD), in terms of receiving and assessing 
applications for asylum (with the exception of the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark, 
who opted out from all or some measures of the current APD – at the time of this writing, 
the UK was still part of the EU).  Creation of a common asylum process was designed, in part, 
to prevent the movement of asylum applicants (referred to, as noted above, as “secondary 
movements”) from one EU member state to another in search of more favorable conditions 
for applying for asylum.39 The APD governs the determination as to which member state will 
consider a given asylum applicant (as noted earlier, this means, in most cases, the first member 
state that the applicant sets foot in), the processing of individual asylum applications, and the 
appeal procedures.40  
The standardization of processes for assessing asylum applications and the adherence to 
the principle of non-refoulement, does not necessarily imply that the European Union and 
its member states have a clear understanding of what it can and cannot do with respect to 
applicants who may have been foreign fighters, involved in terrorism, or having been engaged 
in serious crime. According to Article 33 of the UN Refugee Convention, the principle of non-
refoulement does not apply to individuals who threaten national security and/or have been 
convicted of a serious crime and are deemed to constitute a threat to the public. At the same 
time, the EU Charter considers non-refoulement to be an inalienable right, irrespective of that 
individual’s background and the threat he/she poses.41 The prohibition on sending a migrant 
whose asylum application has been rejected on the grounds that he/she poses a threat to 
public safety (or on any other grounds for that matter) back to their country of origin where 
it is reasonably likely that this individual will face persecution does not mean that he/she will 
be allowed to stay in an EU member state. Deporting a migrant whose asylum application has 
been rejected to a third country where he/she is not expected to be persecuted is not generally 
considered to be a violation of the principle of non-refoulement. Accordingly, in 2016, the 
European Union created a partnership framework with third countries in Africa and the Middle 
East as well as a range of bilateral treaties to allow for resettling migrants not granted refugee 
status in those countries as well as blocking the flow of migrants to Europe.42  
Beyond the issue of adhering to common asylum procedures and standards, as well as 
commitments under the UN Refugee Convention, EU member states are free to determine 
immigration and naturalization policies. Most EU member states require that immigrants 
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applying for citizenship: possess knowledge of the relevant language, show some understanding 
of the legal and political system, demonstrate appropriate behavior (e.g., no criminal record, 
continuous employment records, etc.), and demonstrate a willingness to integrate and accept 
the values of the larger society.43 In terms of the waiting period required before a permanent 
resident can be naturalized, there is considerable variability across European countries. 
In Austria, Italy, and Spain, the waiting period is ten years whereas Germany requires that 
applicants for citizenship reside in the country as permanent residents for at least eight years 
and France, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the Czech Republic require a waiting period of only 
five years. No EU country grants automatic citizenship to children born in the country to foreign 
citizens, but some EU member states allow children to receive citizenship upon birth if the 
parents have legally resided in the country for a period ranging from three to ten years.44 
Removal of citizenship also falls within the purview of individual European countries and 
can be the result of an individual voluntarily renouncing citizenship, fraud relating to the 
naturalization process, prolonged residence abroad, or service in a foreign army. A number of 
EU countries also allow for the revocation of citizenship due to treason or disloyalty. This can 
cover serious crimes (Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Bulgaria), acting against the constitution 
(Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, France, Denmark), demonstrating disloyalty (Ireland, Cyprus, 
Malta), undermining national interests (France, Greece, Romania, Slovenia, and the UK), and/
or involvement in terrorism activities (France, the UK, and the Netherlands).45 Overall then, 
immigration matters are largely the purview of individual European countries, though they are 
more limited in their ability to act autonomously with respect to international conventions and 
EU rules regarding migrants applying for asylum. However, given that immigration policy has 
become a major issue in Europe and helped lead to the formation in Hungary, Poland, Austria, 
Italy, Denmark, the Netherlands, and elsewhere in the EU, of governments largely hostile to 
immigration, this suggests that it is highly unlikely that EU member states will create common 
immigration guidelines and policies outside of those already in existence for asylum-seekers.46  
However, the reality of the situation, as far as immigration is concerned, is that the bulk of 
migrants try to claim formal refugee status via applying for asylum, and therefore the member 
states are limited in their abilities to develop and implement their own policies at a time when 
the public is increasingly backing national politicians that want to halt the flow of migrants. 
While this has not yet led to serious calls to withdraw from the common asylum policy, it has led 
to attempts by member state governments to modify the shared asylum policy.47 It is likely that 
as long as the EU modifies its asylum policies to be in keeping with the demands of its national 
governments, the system will survive. If it fails to do so, however, this risks the withdrawal (or 
refusal to accept) by member states from the provisions of the ADP (as has previously been 
done by Ireland, the UK, and Denmark). Indeed, as noted earlier, rejection of the EU’s various 
rules and policies with respect to the free movement of persons across borders played a large 
role in the United Kingdom’s decision to withdraw from the European Union and there have 
been calls by populist politicians elsewhere in Europe, such as Marine Le Pen in France, to 
withdraw from the EU for similar reasons.48
As with the issue of re-establishing border controls at internal Schengen borders discussed 
earlier, the main drivers behind limiting the freedom of movement across borders, terrorism and 
fear of waves of migrants, are likely to also impact immigration policy in the respective member 
states.  We have already seen a tightening of immigration requirements for non-asylum seekers 
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and EU institutions have been under considerable pressure to reform the common asylum 
system.  At present the European Council is considering seven legislative proposals made by 
the European Commission to reform the asylum system and, in so doing, perhaps assuage the 
primary concerns voiced by member states who fear the current system does not adequately 
process asylum-seekers and repatriate those who do not meet the threshold.  The proposals 
include a reforming of the Dublin system so that asylum applicants are more equitably distributed 
among member states rather than being forced to claim asylum in the first EU country to which 
they arrive, creating an EU asylum agency to be responsible for common modes of assessment 
for asylum applications, initiating common asylum processes and procedures (including stricter 
rules to prevent abuse), and establishing common rules for resettling refugees in the EU and 
internationally.49 While it is too early to determine whether these latest proposals will be deemed 
acceptable to all the member states, it seems likely that if the EU does not fix its common asylum 
policies, the member states will take back this aspect of their respective national sovereignty 
as some of them are now doing with respect to border controls.  After all, if the objective is to 
have better control over who is present in a member state’s territory, border controls will be less 
effective if individuals deemed to be either a threat or an economic migrant are able to live and 
travel in the member state due to EU asylum policies.
The EU Role in Combatting  
Cross-Border Threats
As with immigration issues, efforts to combat cross-border threats and illegal activities in 
Europe are based on an amalgamation of EU-wide mechanisms, national-level measures, and 
arrangements between EU member states. Given that control of borders is a major factor 
in establishing territorial sovereignty and ensuring security for a country’s citizens, national 
governments in the EU have endeavored to preserve their respective monopolies over this 
issue. At the same time, due to Schengen, internal EU borders cannot be treated like an external 
border (and some EU countries, like Germany, do not currently have external Schengen land 
borders). On the other hand, the agencies responsible for coping with cross-border threats such 
as smuggling, human trafficking, and international terrorism, are national agencies because they 
gather intelligence or enforce laws and these functions lie very much within the scope of the 
authority and legal frameworks of the member states, not the EU itself.  
The European Union’s role in combatting smuggling, human trafficking, and cross-border 
terrorism focuses primarily on information-sharing and coordination of actions and efforts 
between member states. In terms of information sharing, the most important information-
sharing mechanism currently in use is the aforementioned Schengen Information System, 
version II (SIS II). SIS II is a common IT system that allows national policing, border control, 
customs, citizenship, vehicle registration, and judicial entities to share information on suspects 
and contraband. Member states share information  on criminal suspects (accused of serious 
crimes), those denied access to the Schengen Area (or deported from it), missing persons, 
known cases of identity fraud, and individuals who have been subpoenaed or otherwise 
required to appear in court, as well as stolen vehicles, firearms, equipment, documents, credit 
cards, and other items.50 SIS II works by providing ‘hits’ (alerts) regarding these persons or items 
that are accessible to the aforementioned national authorities operating internally and at the 
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external borders and ports of entry into the Schengen Area (including airports and seaports). 
Each member state is responsible for operating its own national database as well as a national 
SIRENE (Supplementary Information Request at the National Entries) bureau that is responsible 
for around-the-clock coordination of information on alerts, including providing supplementary 
information, validating the identity of wanted persons, contacting member states when an 
arrest or other action has been taken on a hit, and other related activities.51  
A second mechanism for information-sharing within the European Union is handled by the 
previously mentioned European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex). Frontex provides risk 
analysis and the overall intelligence picture relating to smuggling, human trafficking, terrorism, 
and other border security threats to member states based on reports made to it by law 
enforcement, intelligence, and other agencies of member states via the Frontex Risk Analysis 
Network (FRAN). FRAN indicators include information on illegal border crossings, refusals of 
entry, detections of fraudulent documents, individuals overstaying visas, deportations, asylum 
applications, and other data.52  
A third EU mechanism for information-sharing is Europol, the European Agency for Law 
Enforcement Cooperation. While law enforcement is a national function within the EU, Europol 
serves as a kind of clearing house/fusion center for the sharing of intelligence and other 
information across EU member states and, via bilateral cooperation agreements, with sixteen 
non-EU countries as well as international organizations such as Interpol. Europol assists a 
range of national law enforcement agencies including those dealing with immigration, border 
security, financial crimes, terrorism, organized crime, and other areas. In addition to facilitating 
the exchange of information, Europol provides analysis and support for operations, technical 
expertise, and generates strategic threat assessments.53 Europol operates a number of internal 
analytical centers including the European Cybercrime Center, the European Counter Terrorism 
Center, and the European Migrant Smuggling Center.  
Eurojust, the European Union Judicial Cooperation Unit, is yet another coordinating 
mechanism. Created in 2001, Eurojust helps foster coordination and assists in investigations 
and prosecutions across multiple EU member states. The agency may request a member state 
to investigate or prosecute a criminal act, may facilitate the creation of joint investigative teams 
across member states, may help determine in which member state it may be more fruitful to 
prosecute criminal activity that occurs across member states, and may assist Europol in its 
information-sharing and support functions.54
Under the ‘Solidarity Clause’ of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), 
member states can request immediate EU assistance during crises. The EU can provide teams 
of law enforcement officers from other member states. As previously mentioned, in the area 
of border security, Frontex can provide RABIT teams from other member states, and the same 
approach can be used to put together Joint Investigative Teams (JITs), engage in Joint Customs 
Operations (JCOs), and engage in common financial crimes investigations using joint Financial 
Intelligence Units (FIUs).55
In short, there are multiple mechanisms in place on the part of the European Union to facilitate 
the combatting of cross-border threats. Naturally, here too there are fissures between certain 
member states and the EU. Of the many factors motivating the British withdrawal from the EU, 
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one of them had to do with the British government’s refusal to adhere to the strict rules for 
data protection employed by EU institutions.56 Nevertheless, while there is no indication that 
cooperation on the part of member states via these EU platforms, institutions, or frameworks 
presents a problem in the way that common approaches to coping with migrants or open internal 
borders currently do, the upcoming British withdrawal from the European Union is expected to 
disrupt information-sharing and cooperation between the EU and the United Kingdom, though it 
is unlikely to fundamentally alter the existence or functioning of these EU mechanisms.
CONCLUSION
The European Union plays a critical role in border management in Europe and, taken as a 
whole, the Schengen Area arguably constitutes the world’s most extensive and complex border 
management regime. As in many other areas of public policy, border management has come 
increasingly under the authority of EU institutions as the European Union has grown stronger at 
the expense of individual national governments. Not surprisingly, the increase in EU power and 
authority has also led to more calls for limiting, if not rolling back, the supra-national entity’s 
powers and reasserting national sovereignty in the member states. Over the last two decades, 
the EU has faced significant challenges in maintaining the stability of the Euro, coping with 
the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, fending off economic nationalism (i.e., moves toward 
greater economic independence) - particularly in some of its larger member states, maintaining 
stable trade ties with the United States, China, and Russia, and, of course, coping with a 
wave of migration. These challenges have taken their toll on the EU with the most dramatic 
manifestation of their negative impact being the United Kingdom’s decision to withdraw from 
the European Union. BREXIT has precipitated what is arguably the greatest crisis the EU has 
faced since its founding, as the European Union is about to lose a member state with significant 
global clout and the second or third largest economy in the EU (depending on how one 
measures the size of the economy). 
As noted earlier, other countries are also not immune to these centrifugal forces, though there 
is no indication at present that any other member state is seriously considering leaving the EU. 
It may be the case, however, that preventing a future erosion of the EU may require modifying 
paradigms in a variety of legal and policy areas and border management appears to be one 
of these. While there is no sign that EU institutions, platforms, and mechanisms for border 
management, particularly with respect to cross-border threats such as smuggling, human 
trafficking, and cross-border terrorism, will be significantly modified, the paradigm is changing 
with respect to the Schengen internal borders, the free flow of persons and goods, and the 
handling of migration and asylum. While it is impossible to predict what the paradigm in these 
areas will look like, current trends do seem to point in the direction of some degree of permanent 
border controls on internal Schengen borders, perhaps highly technology-based to minimize the 
feeling of crossing a border for those doing so – in this context it will be interesting to see how 
the British and Irish governments (with the blessing of the EU in the case of the latter) try to 
avoid recreating a ‘hard border” around Northern Ireland and it looks likely that they will do so 
via creating a customs border between Northern Ireland and the mainland UK.  Likewise, fears of 
migrants (both in terms of volume and in terms of potential radicalization) are leading to attempts 
to rework EU asylum processes to provide national governments with more control over who is 
admitted to their respective territories. Thus, in this area as well, the paradigm is shifting towards 
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more member-state control, or may do so in the area of asylum if the EU fails to come up with 
reforms that are acceptable to its member states. All of this does not suggest that somehow the 
European Union’s days are numbered. The EU provides significant benefits to its members that 
likely outweigh its limitations, even in terms of border management issues. The public in Europe 
and mainstream politicians (with the prominent exception of the UK) continue to be supportive 
of maintaining the EU. Thus, while parts of the border-management paradigm are shifting, in 
some cases in fairly dramatic ways, the EU, with its laws, institutions, policies, and the common 
European identity that it helps foster, is not likely to disappear.  
The changes that are occurring in Europe with respect to the control over borders and the 
management of migration are indicative of more general trends in the developed world.  In 
their own ways, other developed countries outside the EU are also struggling with both 
issues and are establishing policies to better control land, air, and maritime borders as well 
as to restrict migration.  The United States, for example, has seen both a dramatic increase in 
apprehensions along its southwest border (almost a million in 2019, more than double the 
number of apprehensions in 2018 and triple the apprehensions in 2017 57) and has toughened 
rules for asylum-seekers.  Asylum-seekers coming from Central America into the US via Mexico 
are now denied the ability to claim asylum in the US and must request asylum in Mexico or 
elsewhere (though ongoing litigation could change this rule).58 Australia, though with fits and 
starts, has employed a foreign outsourcing of asylum-seekers known as the ‘Pacific Solution’ and 
has unequivocally denied asylum to anyone arriving illegally by sea.  Other developed countries 
with tough immigration and asylum policies include Japan, South Korea, and Israel.  In short, the 
changes we are witnessing in Europe are part of a larger global trend driven not only by security 
concerns and fear of terrorism, but also, and perhaps primarily, by demographic growth in poor 
countries that is leading to waves of migrants and the attendant fears that unfettered migration 
will lead to unwanted social and economic changes (though, of course, fear of negative changes 
due to migration is not, by any means, new).  Demographic projections indicate that most of the 
world’s demographic growth well into mid-century will be occurring in the developing world, 
particularly sub-Saharan Africa, and given the likelihood that these countries will be unable 
to provide for burgeoning populations (due, in part, to increasing food and water insecurity 
resulting from climate change), this suggests that migration pressures from poor countries to 
rich countries will grow and trigger greater resistance in rich countries.  We are thus already in 
an era of retrenchment in which the free movement of persons that characterized the era of 
globalization of the mid-20th century to early 21st century will be more limited.
For the United States, some of the policy challenges facing the EU as discussed above hold 
potential lessons.  Naturally, the United States is one country, state lines are not international 
borders, and the federal government has formal authority over border security and immigration 
policy.  Yet the federal government often relies on state and local authorities to assist in law 
enforcement and provision of services along the border and in dealing with migrant populations 
inside the country.  Some elements of the aforementioned collaborative frameworks created 
by the European Union to enhance cooperation between member states, as well as between 
member states and EU institutions, could be modified and translated to cooperation between 
states (particularly during periods of intensive influx of migrants when a state’s authorities 
might be overwhelmed), between state and local authorities in a given state, and between 
federal authorities and state and local authorities.  The kind of information-sharing, task 
forces, and mutual-aid agreements seen in Europe may, with modification, improve the 
Homeland Security Affairs | Volume 16 – Article 1  (April 2020) | WWW.HSAJ.ORG
16 Border Management in Europe: Is the Paradigm Evolving?   |   By Nadav Morag
functioning of the border security and immigration system in the U.S.  Similarly, some of the 
approaches to asylum and immigration across the EU could, with modification, possibly inform 
US policy, particularly if the federal government were to allow states to have more influence 
in determining where refugees are resettled or in seeking out new immigrants with specific 
skills.  Of course, as the Europeans have shown, truly effective border security and immigration 
policies are aspirational, but concrete lessons have been learned and many of these could 
potentially inform U.S. policymakers.  In short, as far as this and other aspects of the homeland 
security enterprise are concerned, there is a wealth of knowledge and experience outside the 
United States and some of it may be useful, with the appropriate adaptations, in informing 
American policy makers and improving policy.
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